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Abstract—Modern blockchain systems support creation of
smart contracts – stateful programs hosted and executed on
a blockchain. Smart contracts hold and transfer significant
amounts of digital currency which makes them an attractive
target for security attacks. It has been shown that many
contracts deployed to public ledgers contain security vulnera-
bilities. Moreover, the design of blockchain systems does not
allow the code of the smart contract to be changed after it
has been deployed to the system. Therefore, it is important
to guarantee the correctness of smart contracts prior to their
deployment.
Formal verification is widely used to check smart contracts
for correctness with respect to given specification. In this work
we consider program synthesis techniques in which the speci-
fication is used to generate correct-by-construction programs.
We focus on one of the special cases of program synthesis where
programs are modeled with finite state machines (FSMs). We
show how FSM synthesis can be applied to the problem of
automatic smart contract generation. Several case studies of
smart contracts are outlined: crowdfunding platform, blinded
auction and a license contract. For each case study we specify
the corresponding smart contract with a set of formulas in
linear temporal logic (LTL) and use this specification together
with test scenarios to synthesize a FSM model for that contract.
These models are later used to generate executable Solidity
code which can be directly used in a blockchain system.
1. Introduction
Since the invention of a blockchain data structure in
2008 various cryptocurrencies have been emerging, evolving
and gaining popularity. This popularity is explained by
the fact that blockchain systems are fully operable with-
out a trusted entity. Recent cryptocurrencies support cre-
ation of smart contracts – stateful programs executed on a
blockchain that encode the rules governing transactions. The
execution of smart contracts is enforced by the consensus
algorithm in the underlying blockchain system.
Smart contracts are a powerful tool to encode arbitrary
contractual agreements in a machine-readable form but as
with any programs they are error-prone and hard to reason
about. Furthermore, the blockchain systems design prin-
ciples make impossible contract’s code modification after
it has been deployed to blockchain. Also smart contracts
hold and transfer significant amount of digital currency
which makes them an attractive target of various attacks and
drastically increases the cost of an error in smart contract
code. It has been shown that many contracts deployed to
public ledgers contain security vulnerabilities and these
vulnerabilities have led to theft of millions of US dollars
in cryptocurrency equivalent. Thus, it is of paramount im-
portance to ensure that smart contracts are correct. Various
methods based on formal verification have been proposed
to achieve this goal [1], [2], [3].
Another method to build correct programs is program
synthesis, which has a lot in common with formal veri-
fication. The problem of program synthesis is formulated
as follows: given a specification in formal logic, construct
a program conforming to that specification. This problem
is known to be undecidable in general, however various
methods were proposed for some special cases of programs.
Unlike formal verification, automated synthesis of smart
contracts has received very little attention, although program
synthesis application for smart contracts looks promising
given the fact that they are relatively small (less than 100
SLOC in average [4]).
Program synthesis is a very broad topic and in this
work we only focus on the problem of FSM synthesis
where programs are defined in terms of FSMs. The ra-
tionale behind this is that smart contract logic can often
be expressed with an FSM. Moreover, modeling contracts
as FSMs is a recommended design pattern for Solidity –
a language of Ethereum [5] contracts [6]. In fact there is
a tool VERISOLID [7] that facilitates creating FSM smart
contract models and generating Solidity code from these
models. A user can specify temporal properties and verify
that generated contracts conform to these properties.
In this work we employ techniques and tools (EFSM-
TOOLS 1) outlined in [8]. We have no intent to compare
different FSM synthesis tools as for case studies in Sec-
tion 3 synthesis solving terminates within seconds. In our
approach input events of a FSM correspond to methods
of a contract and output actions – to implementations of
those methods. We synthesize smart contract FSM models
based on formal specification in temporal logic and test
1. https://github.com/ulyantsev/EFSM-tools/
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Figure 1. Data-flow diagram of the proposed approach.
scenarios. Afterwards, given the contract’s state declaration
and the implementation of its methods in a corresponding
programming language, we can generate contract’s code that
is guaranteed to be correct with respect to the specification.
Code generation is straightforward and similar to that in
VERISOLID tool, however VERISOLID does not support
multiple transitions labeled by the same event so we had to
implement our own tool FSMC 2. The high-level data-flow
diagram for the proposed approach is shown in Figure 1.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, this work
is the first attempt to employ specification-based program
synthesis techniques to automatically generate smart con-
tract source code. Specifically, we provide case studies to
show that LTL synthesis can be successfully applied for
some types of contracts to generate their FSM models and
use these models to obtain source code that meets some
formal properties. We also briefly discuss the applicability of
program synthesis for automated smart contract generation.
2. Background and related work
In this section we introduce some basic concepts of
blockchain systems and smart contracts necessary to un-
derstand the rest of the paper. Then we define FSMs that
are used to model smart contracts and introduce formalism
that are used to specify them. Finally we state the problem
of specification-based FSM synthesis and provide some
references to its efficient solutions.
2.1. Smart contracts
A blockchain is a list of records, called blocks, con-
taining some data. Blockchain can be used as a ledger
that is maintained in a distributed network, for instance in
cryptocurrencies this ledger stores a transaction list. Effec-
tively, a ledger in cryptocurrencies stores the mapping from
2. https://github.com/d-suvorov/fsmc/
accounts to their balances in digital currency. We refer to
this digital currency as coins. The nodes of a network called
miners execute consensus algorithm and decide on which
blocks will be added. It is assumed that the majority of nodes
are honest as they are incentivized to add new valid blocks,
and the integrity of the system is based on that assumption.
Modern blockchain systems support smart contracts –
executable programs stored on a blockchain. A contract is
executed by miners which agree on the outcome of the
execution and update the blockchain accordingly. Hence ar-
bitrary contractual agreements can be expressed in program
code and enforced without relying on a trusted party. Most
popular smart contract systems share the same concepts but
for the rest of the paper we consider Ethereum-like smart
contracts.
In Ethereum [5], smart contracts are a type of accounts
associated with executable code and a storage file. Smart
contracts can be created by sending a transaction of a special
kind to a blockchain. A code of the contract consists of
methods – entry points which are called when transactions
are send to the address of that contract. Essentially, transac-
tions act as method invocations. Contracts can receive coins
with these transactions and send coins to other accounts via
send instructions. Each instruction of a method consumes
some amount of gas during execution. The user who sends
a transaction must pay gas for its execution. If a transaction
runs out of gas during its execution the control returns to
sender. An example of a smart contract is shown in the next
section.
The problem of creating correct smart contracts have
been actively studied over the past years. One of the first
work by Delmolino et al. outlines common pitfalls spe-
cific to smart contract development. Since then, a vari-
ety of techniques have been used to verify smart con-
tracts. Different tools based on symbolic execution were
created: OYENTE [2], MYTHRIL [9], MANTICORE [10],
MAIAN [11]. An early work of Bhargavan et al. uses F*
programming language [1]. Lately modern theorem provers
have been employed to formalize different aspects of smart
contracts in blockchain systems [3], [12], [13] and used to
mechanize reasoning about those aspects. Sergey et al. [14]
design a new functional language, implement its embedding
into Coq and mechanize proofs of safety and liveness prop-
erties of smart contracts. Flint [15] is a programming lan-
guage that was designed specifically for writing robust smart
contracts. Flint employs linear type theory to prevent unin-
tentional loss of coins. An interesting example of contract-
oriented languages are Bamboo [16] and Obsidian [17] as
they model smart contracts as state machines and make state
transitions explicit. Model checking can also be used to
verify smart contracts. Nehai et al. [18] use NUSMV model
checker to create a blockchain application model (including
a blockchain model itself) and check its temporal properties.
Idelberger et al. [19] propose to use defeasible deontic
logic to create smart contracts, which is somewhat similar
to our approach. However, the execution of such smart
contracts relies on an external logic engine. This setup neg-
atively affects the performance. We generate FSM models
which can be encoded in some programming language and
executed directly.
2.2. Specification-based FSM synthesis
(a)
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Figure 2. An example of an FSM (a) and its Kripke structure (b).
We are following [8] and define a finite state machine
(FSM) as a tuple (S, sinit, E, Z, δ, λ), where
• S is a finite set of states,
• sinit ∈ S is the initial state,
• E is a finite set of input events,
• Z is a finite set of output actions,
• δ : S × E → S is the transition function,
• λ : S×E → Z∗ is the output function (with Z∗ we
denote a set of strings over Z).
An FSM reads a sequence of input events one by one and
transforms it into a sequence of output actions. With each
input event it generates new output actions according to λ
and changes its active state according to δ.
Model checking. Model checking is a technique for
automatically verifying finite-state systems with respect to a
given specification [20]. It is common to formalize the spec-
ification as a formula in temporal logic. In linear temporal
logic (LTL), formulas express some properties of execution
paths [21]. To proceed with its definition we first define
a Kripke structure. With P we denote a set of atomic
propositions, which characterize execution states. Formally,
a Kripke structure is a tuple (SK , I, T, L), where
• SK is a set of states,
• I ⊆ SK is a set of initial states,
• T ⊆ SK×SK is a transition relation, which must be
left-total (that is, from each state there is a transition
to at least one state),
• L : SK → 2P is a labeling function.
An example of an FSM and a corresponding Kripke struc-
ture is shown in Figure 2. To label transitions we use this
notation: input event / output action.
LTL formulas are defined over infinite paths in Kripke
structures. The formulas are built up from temporal op-
erators, atomic propositions and connectives familiar from
propositional logic (∧, ∨, ¬,→). If f is a Boolean formula,
then it simply states with which atomic propositions the first
state of the path is marked. If f is an LTL formula, then
saying that f holds for a state of an infinite path means that
it holds for the infinite suffix of the path starting from this
state. The following temporal operators can be used.
• The neXt operator: X f means that f has to hold at
the next state of the path.
• The Globally operator: Gf means that f has to hold
on the entire suffix of the path.
• The Future operator: F f means that f eventually
has to hold (somewhere on the suffix of the path
starting from this state).
• The Until operator: f U g means that f has to hold
at least until g becomes true, which must hold at
this or some future state.
• The Release operator: f R g means that g has hold
until and including the point where f first becomes
true; if f never becomes true, g must remain true
forever.
The formula f is true for some Kripke model M means that
it is satisfied for all infinite paths of M .
FSM synthesis. The problem of FSM synthesis by the
specification is well-known. In its different statements the
specification may be given as temporal formula, a set of
test scenarios or the combination of the two. A test sce-
nario for FSM (S, sinit, E, Z, δ, λ) is a sequence of pairs
(e1, A1), . . . , (en, An), where each ei ∈ E and Ai ∈ Z∗
and, a FSM conforms to it if and only if it produces a
sequence of actions A1 ·A2 · . . . ·An (with · we denote se-
quence concatenation) given a sequence of events e1, . . . , en
as its input. Exact synthesis methods are mostly based on
transition to SAT [8], [22]. In [8] different approaches based
on transition to SAT and QSAT were examined. In the most
efficient approach scenarios are encoded in SAT and LTL
formulas are incorporated with iterative counterexample pro-
hibition. In BOSY tool [23], [24], encoding in QSAT instead
of SAT is used and a transition system is generated only
from a set of LTL formulas. The generated transition system
is guaranteed to be minimum in terms of the number of
states.
3. Case studies
This section contains case studies that evolve from sim-
ple example for illustration purposes only to more realistic
examples taken from the literature. For each case study we
provide a formal LTL specification and a result model that
was generated with this specification and test scenarios.
In this section we extend FSMs with guard con-
ditions. A guard condition is a Boolean expression
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Figure 3. Blinded auction. FSM generated for size = 4 states.
that labels FSM transition. Guard conditions affect the
semantics of FSMs in the following way: the tran-
sition can be executed only if its guard condition
is satisfied. We use this notation to label transitions:
input event [guard condition] / output action. A test sce-
nario now is a sequence of triples {(ei, ci, Ai)}, where
ei is an input event, ci is a guard condition and Ai is a
sequence of output actions. If a sequence of output actions is
omitted (as in input event [guard condition] / or (ei, ci, .))
it is implicitly assumed that it consists of one action with
the same name as the corresponding input event.
In our approach input events of an FSM correspond to
methods of a contract and output actions – to implementa-
tions of those methods. We specify smart contracts with a
set of LTL formulas in terms of these events and actions.
Formal specification is then combined with test scenarios
and provided as input to EFSM-TOOLS to generate an FSM
that complies with given specification and test scenarios.
Figure 3 shows an example of a generated FSM. Given the
implementation of FSM output actions and the definitions
of used predicates, FSM can be translated to executable
code. Figure 4 shows an example of generated Solidity code,
where lines 2 – 12 correspond to contract’s state definition,
lines 14 – 19 – to predicate definition and lines 40 – 44 – to
bid action definition (other action definitions are omitted
for brevity).
3.1. Crowdfunding
For illustrative purpose, let us first consider a simplistic
example of a crowdfunding platform. In such a platform
users can donate coins (denoted with event donate) during
a predefined period of time which ends when variable
donationOver becomes true. When the donation period
is over, the owner of the campaign can request collected
coins (event getFunds). After that donors can claim their
donations back (event reclaim) and possibly get them back
if not enough coins were collected during the campaign
(notFunded = True). Intuitively, one can model the logic of
this contract using an FSM with two states. More formally,
the logic of described contract is formulated as follows:
1) getFunds cannot happen more than once;
2) donate cannot happen after getFunds has hap-
pened;
3) reclaim cannot happen before getFunds;
4) getFunds can happen only if donationOver =
True;
5) reclaim can happen only if notFunded = True.
With a straightforward translation we can formalize these
properties in LTL as follows.
G(getFunds→ X¬FgetFunds) (1)
G(getFunds→ ¬Fdonate) (2)
getFunds R ¬reclaim (3)
G(getFunds→ donationOver) (4)
G(reclaim→ notFunded) (5)
Figure 5 shows an FSM generated with EFSM-TOOLS from
this specification the set of scenarios S = {s1, s2, s3},
where
s1 = [(donate,True, .), (donate,True, .),
(donate,True, .)];
s2 = [(getFunds, donationOver, .),
(reclaim, notFunded, .),
(reclaim, notFunded, .)];
s3 = [(donate,True, .), (getFunds, donationOver, .),
(reclaim, notFunded, .), (reclaim, notFunded, .)].
Another advantage of using formal logic is that now we
can reason about about the system. For instance, from
properties 1 and 3 we can derive that getFunds cannot
happen after reclaim.
3.2. Blinded auction
Now we consider a more realistic example of blinded
auction taken from [7]. During a predefined period of time
after contract creation, users can make hidden bids (denoted
with event bid). When this period is over (biddingOver =
True) the auction can be closed (event close), after which
follows the next period when users are allowed to reveal
their bids. When the second period is over (revealOver =
True) the auction can be finished (event finish). At any
time before finishing the auction can be canceled (cancel),
after which users can claim back their bids (event unbid).
The logic of this blinded auction can be formulated as
follows (we provide corresponding LTL formulas along-
side).
1) close, finish and cancel cannot happen more
than once:
G(close→ X¬Fclose),
G(finish→ X¬Ffinish),
G(cancel→ X¬Fcancel);
1 c o n t r a c t B l i n d e d A u c t i o n {
2 enum S t a t e { ST 0 , ST 1 , ST 2 , ST 3 }
3 S t a t e p r i v a t e s t a t e = S t a t e s . ST 0 ;
4 s t r u c t Bid {
5 bytes32 b l i n d e d B i d ;
6 u i n t d e p o s i t ;
7 }
8 mapping ( address => Bid [ ] ) p r i v a t e b i d s ;
9 mapping ( address => u i n t ) p r i v a t e p e n d i n g R e t u r n s ;
10 address p r i v a t e h i g h e s t B i d d e r ;
11 u i n t p r i v a t e h i g h e s t B i d ;
12 b o o l e a n p r i v a t e c l o s e d = f a l s e ;
13
14 f u n c t i o n b i d d i n g O v e r ( ) p r i v a t e r e t u r n s ( bool ) {
15 r e t u r n now > c r e a t i o n T i m e + 5 days ;
16 }
17 f u n c t i o n r e v e a l O v e r ( ) p r i v a t e r e t u r n s ( bool ) {
18 r e t u r n now >= c r e a t i o n T i m e + 10 days ;
19 }
20
21 f u n c t i o n c a n c e l ( ) p u b l i c {
22 r e q u i r e ( s t a t e == S t a t e s . ST 0
23 | | s t a t e == S t a t e s . ST 2 )
24 i f ( s t a t e == ST 0 ) {
25 c a n c e l a c t i o n ( ) ; s t a t e = ST 3 ;
26 }
27 i f ( s t a t e == ST 2 ) {
28 c a n c e l a c t i o n ( ) ; s t a t e = ST 3 ;
29 }
30 }
31
32 f u n c t i o n b i d ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
33 f u n c t i o n c l o s e ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
34 f u n c t i o n wi thdraw ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
35 f u n c t i o n r e v e a l ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
36 f u n c t i o n f i n i s h ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
37 f u n c t i o n unb id ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
38
39 f u n c t i o n b i d a c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c {
40 b i d s [ msg . sender ] . push ( Bid ({
41 b l i n d e d B i d : b l i n d e d B i d ,
42 d e p o s i t : msg . v a l u e
43 } ) ) ;
44 p e n d i n g R e t u r n s [ msg . sender ] += msg . v a l u e ;
45 }
46
47 f u n c t i o n c l o s e a c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
48 f u n c t i o n r e v e a l a c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
49 f u n c t i o n f i n i s h a c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
50 f u n c t i o n w i t h d r a w a c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
51 f u n c t i o n c a n c e l a c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
52 f u n c t i o n u n b i d a c t i o n ( ) p u b l i c { . . . }
53 }
Figure 4. Blinded auction. Generated Solidity code.
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Figure 5. Crowdfunding. FSM generated for size = 2 states.
2) bid cannot happen after close has happened:
G(close→ ¬Fbid);
3) reveal and cancel cannot happen after finish
has happened:
G(finish→ ¬F(reveal ∨ cancel))
4) finish, close, bid and reveal cannot happen
after cancel has happened:
G(cancel→ ¬F(finish ∨ close ∨ bid ∨ reveal))
5) finish and reveal cannot happen before close:
close R (¬finish ∧ ¬reveal);
6) unbid cannot happen before cancel:
cancel R ¬unbid;
7) withdraw cannot happen before finish:
finish R ¬withdraw;
8) close can happen only if biddingOver = True:
G(close→ biddingOver);
9) finish can happen only if revealOver = True:
G(finish→ revealOver).
This formal LTL specification and a set of test scenarios
was used to generate a FSM depicted in Figure 3. Test
scenarios for this and the next case study can be found
online 3. Given Solidity code associated with output actions
labeling FSM transitions, the full smart contract code can
be generated. The code generated from synthesized FSM is
shown in Figure 4.
3.3. License server
This is an example taken from [19]. Here we consider a
smart contract that could be used to monitor the execution
of the agreement between two parties, namely Licensor
and Licensee. We assume that these parties perform as
client agents connected to some blockchain network. The
contract consists of the following clauses which were copied
from [19] and annotated with event names that we are going
to use in the rest of this section to model contract execution.
1) The Licensor grants the Licensee a license to eval-
uate the Product (getLicense).
2) Licensee must not publish the results of the eval-
uation (use) of the Product without the approval
(getApproval) of the Licensor; the approval must
be obtained before the publication. If the Licensee
3. https://github.com/d-suvorov/sc-gen
publishes results of the evaluation of the Product
without approval from the Licensor, the Licensee
has 24 hours to remove the material.
3) The Licensee must not publish comments
(comment) on the evaluation of the Product, unless
the Licensee is permitted to publish the results of
the evaluation.
4) If the Licensee is commissioned (getCommission)
to perform an independent evaluation of the Prod-
uct, then the Licensee has the obligation to publish
the evaluation results.
5) This license will terminate automatically if Li-
censee breaches this Agreement.
There is not a timer that can be used to trigger some tran-
sition in a blockchain system, that is why we introduce spe-
cial events noRemove and noPublish. noRemove happens if
the results of the evaluation of the Product were not removed
in due time. noPublish happens if the Licensee was com-
missioned to perform an independent evaluation and did not
published the results. Thus LTL specification is less abstract
and at the first sight less intuitive than the informal descrip-
tion above. For instance to state that it is permitted to use
and publish results after getting an approval we introduce the
property G(getApproval→ G(¬noRemove)): “noRemove
cannot happen after getApproval has happened”. Given
that property, and the fact that getApproval can only
happen after getLicense, we can derive that terminate
cannot happen after getApproval. The latter property can
be formalized and verified, which is an advantage of using
formal logic system for specifying a contract.
We introduce LTL specification in two stages. The fol-
lowing formulas encode general principles of the system
(e.g., “remove cannot happen if nothing has been pub-
lished”).
G(getLicense→ X¬FgetLicense) (1)
G(getApproval→ X¬FgetApproval) (2)
G(noRemove→ X¬FnoRemove) (3)
G(noPublish→ X¬FnoPublish) (4)
publish R ¬remove (5)
G(remove→ X(publish R ¬remove)) (6)
publish R ¬noRemove (7)
G(remove→ X(publish R ¬noRemove)) (8)
getLicense R ¬getApproval (9)
getLicense R ¬getCommission (10)
getCommission R ¬noPublish (11)
G(publish→ X(getCommission R ¬noPublish)) (12)
G(terminate→ X¬FnoRemove) (13)
G(terminate→ X¬FnoPublish) (14)
G(terminate→
¬F(getLicense∨
getApproval ∨ getCommission)) (15)
The following formulas encode contractual clauses.
(getLicense ∨ terminate) R
((use ∨ publish)→ terminate) (1)
G(getLicense→
¬F((use ∨ publish) ∧ terminate)) (2)
(getApproval ∨ getCommission ∨ terminate) R
(comment→ terminate) (3)
G(noRemove→ terminate) (4)
G(noPublish→ terminate) (5)
G(getApproval→ G¬noRemove) (6)
G(getCommission→ G¬noRemove) (7)
An FSM generated from this specification and test sce-
narios is shown in Figure 6. Test scenarios are available
online (the link was provided in the previous section).
The original contract is formulated in terms of deontic
modalities, i.e., in terms of permissions, obligations and
related concepts. A shortcoming of specifying this smart
contract in temporal logic (and using it to synthesize FSM
model) is not tracking these modalities: given a sequence
of actions there is no easy way to figure out permissions
and obligations of contractual parties. On the other hand,
the resulting representation is efficient, which is important
in case of on-chain deployment, and could be used to
determine whether or not the given sequence of actions leads
to contract termination.
4. Conclusion and discussion
We argue that automated program synthesis could find
more applications for smart contract generation as they often
have simpler structure than general purpose programs and
it is an open research question whether a Turing-complete
language is necessary for smart contract programming. We
would like to draw attention of the community to the prob-
lem of automatic synthesis of smart contracts. We provided
several case studies to show that LTL synthesis can be
applied to generate FSM models for smart contracts of
some types. In these models input events correspond to
smart contract methods and output actions correspond to
these methods’ implementation. Generated FSM models can
further be used to obtain programs that are correct with
respect to some formal temporal properties.
Our approach can be straightforwardly extended for
systems of interacting smart contracts and used to specify,
synthesize and verify them. Another interesting method to
extend the supported class of verified properties is to incor-
porate source-level formal verification techniques. Output
actions in synthesized FMSs correspond to smart contract
methods, hence we can use other verification frameworks
to prove source-level properties about these methods and
combine them with temporal properties of FSM models
itself.
In practice smart contracts receive, hold and send coins
and transaction execution costs some amount of gas. It is
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Figure 6. License. FSM generated for size = 6 states.
important to be able to use these concepts to formulate
properties of interest about smart contracts. Hence, other
possibilities for future work include using SAT or SMT to
encode such concepts and extending specification language
to incorporate these.
A drawback of using LTL synthesis is that LTL is not
expressive enough to formulate properties of kind “φ can
happen infinitely often (while ψ has not happened)”. For
example the formula EG φ in CTL can be used to state
that there is a path on which φ always holds. However this
problem can be easily mitigated by specifying test scenarios
in which donate repeats N times, where N is greater than
the number of transitions of FSM to be generated.
Despite the simple remedy for the above problem we
believe that a more suitable formal system to specify smart
contracts is yet to be identified. It is an interesting research
question: how to strike a balance between simplicity and
expressivity of this system to allow effective synthesis of
practical smart contracts.
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